An Analysis of When Juveniles Must Be Afforded Due Process Rights by Smith, Joseph F., Jr.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 1 Article 4
1978
An Analysis of When Juveniles Must Be Afforded
Due Process Rights
Joseph F. Smith Jr.
Nova University Center for the Study of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Joseph F. Smith Jr., An Analysis of When Juveniles Must Be Afforded Due Process Rights, 58 Neb. L. Rev. 136 (1979)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol58/iss1/4
By Joseph F. Smith, Jr.*
An Analysis of When Juveniles
Must Be Afforded Due Process
Rights
I. INTRODUCTION
In a series of notable cases, the United States Supreme Court
has undertaken the process of defining the procedural due process
rights of juvenile offenders. Although the Court has heretofore
decided that a number of specific rights attach in a juvenile pro-
ceeding, there exists no clear indication of the criteria necessary to
determine when these rights attach. A reading of the leading
Supreme Court cases, as well as state court decisions applying
those cases, makes it abundantly clear that when a juvenile faces
the possibility of incarceration for having committed an act which
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, certain consti-
tutional rights must be afforded the juvenile during the adjudica-
tory process.' However, juvenile court statutes providing special
courts for juvenile offenders do not limit the jurisdiction of these
courts to acts which would constitute violations of the states' crim-
inal codes. Instead, the usual statute provides that juveniles may
also be brought before the juvenile court for having committed
such noncriminal acts as truancy, running away, and ungovernable
behavior. Traditionally, both the criminal and noncriminal, or sta-
tus offenses, are included in the definition of delinquency.2
* Associate Professor, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. B.A. 1966,
Alfred University; J.D. 1969, Cornell University.
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Bernstein and Freda H. Pflaum, for their work in locating and reading the
material to the author, and performing other visual tasks necessary for the
preparation of this article.
1. Typically juvenile court proceedings employ a bifurcated trial procedure.
The first phase of this procedure is the "adjudicatory hearing," held for the
sole purpose of determining the merits of the allegations contained in the
petition. If the court determines the allegations are true, the case then en-
ters the second phase or "dispositionary hearing." The function of this latter
phase is to determine the proper treatment and placement of the child.
2. For a survey of state juvenile statutes and their historical development, see
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Recently, there has been a trend to reclassify juvenile offenses.
Under this new approach, delinquency is defined as an act commit-
ted by a juvenile which would constitute a crime if committed by
an adult. This leaves all remaining juvenile offenses to be in-
cluded in a distinct category typically called "Persons or Children
in Need of Supervision" (PINS OR CINS). 3 The question which
will be examined in this article is whether the constitutional safe-
guards afforded juvenile offenders facing potential incarceration
for having committed acts which would constitute crimes if
committed by adults extend as well to status offenders. The im-
portance of this question is demonstrated by the fact that an esti-
mated twenty-three percent of all boys and seventy percent of all
girls held in juvenile institutions are guilty of no crime for which
an adult would be prosecuted.4
IL LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES DEFINING
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF
JUVENILES
Before analyzing when procedural due process rights attach in
juvenile cases, it is first necessary to outline which specific rights
the Supreme Court has afforded juveniles. The leading case defin-
ing which fourteenth amendment due process protections the
states must afford juvenile defendants is In re Gault.5 In Gault,
the United States Supreme Court reviewed an Arizona Supreme
Court decision which affirmed the delinquency adjuciation of a
fifteen year old boy who had been charged with making lewd tele-
phone calls. In the course of this decision, the United States
Supreme Court held that in a delinquency adjudicatory proceed-
Comment, "Delinquent Child':" A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR L.
REv. 352 (1969); Note, The Dilemma of the "Uniquely Juvenile" Offender, 14
Wm. & MARY L REv. 386, 387-89 (1972).
3. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1972 & Supp. 1977); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-2301(8) (A) (Supp. 1977); MD. CTs. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801
(1974 & Supp. 1977); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1977).
For an examination of the California statute, see Gonion, Section 601 Califor-
nia Welfare and Institutions Code: A Need for a Change, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
294. For an examination of the New York statute, see Note, Ungovernability:
The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383 (1974). See generally Stiller
& Elder, PINS-A Concept in Need of Supervision, 12 Am. Cmus. L. REV. 33
(1974).
4. Siegel, Senna & Libby, Legal Aspects of the Juvenile Justice Process: An Over-
view of Current Practices of Law, 12 NEw ENG. L. REV. 223, 228 n.21 (1976).
For detailed statistics concerning the 1973 census of juveniles in public deten-
tion and correctional facilities, see LEAA, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN IN
CUSTODY (Dec., 1977); for the 1975 census, see LEAA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CHLDREN IN CUSTODY (Oct., 1977).
5. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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ing, which could result in commitment in a state institution, due
process 6 demands that the child be afforded the following constitu-
tional rights: adequate written notice,7 notification of the right to
retained or appointed counsel,8 the right to confront and cross-ex-
amine witnesses,9 and the privilege against self-incrimination. 10
Three years after the Gault decision, the Supreme Court, in the
case of In re Winship," addressed the issue of what quantum of
evidence is necessary to adjudicate a child a delinquent. The pre-
cise issue in Winship was whether a state may constitutionally ad-
judicate a twelve year old child a delinquent for allegedly having
stolen $112 and, as a result of that adjudication, confine the child in
a state institution, when the prosecutor was only required to prove
the alleged facts by a preponderance of evidence. 12 The Court
held in Winship that when a child is charged as a delinquent for
allegedly committing an act which would constitute a crime if com-
mitted by an adult, and when such an adjudication could result in
confinement in a state institution, guilt must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.13
6. We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These
relate to the proceedings by which a determination is made as to
whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as a result of alleged misconduct
on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a
state institution. As to these proceedings, there appears to be little
current dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause has
a role to play.
Id. at 13.
7. Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have de-
scribed-that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally ade-
quate in a civil or criminal proceeding. It does not allow a hearing to
be held in which a youth's freedom and his parents' right to his cus-
tody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the
hearing of the specific issues that they must meet.
Id. at 33-34.
8. We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delin-
quency which may result in commitment to an institution in which
the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be
notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by
them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be ap-
pointed to represent the child.
Id. at 41.
9. 'WVe now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency
and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the
absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examina-
tion in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements." Id. at 57.
10. 'We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults." Id. at 55.
11. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
12. Id. at 359-60.
13. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority in Winship, stated: 'This case
presents the single, narrow question whether proof beyond a reasonable
[VOL. 58:136
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When analyzing the leading Supreme Court cases developing
the procedural due process rights of juveniles, one must note that
the Supreme Court chose not to extend to juveniles all constitu-
tional protections which had previously been afforded state crimi-
nal defendants through the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution.14 Rather, the court predicated the decisions in the
juvenile cases upon the concept of fundamental fairness. In em-
ploying this concept, which was first applied in Kent v. United
States,15 the Court has attempted to weigh the effect of granting
constitutional safeguards to children against the humanitarian
philosophy and informality of the juvenile court system.16 Using
doubt is among the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment' required
during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act which
could constitute a crime if committed by an adult." Id. at 359 (quoting 387
U.S. at 30). He concluded.
[Tihe constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency pro-
ceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault ....
We therefore hold . . "that, where a 12-year-old child is charged
with an act of stealing which renders him liable to confinement for as
long as six years, then, as a matter of due process ... the case
against him must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. at 368 (quoting In re Winship, 24 N.Y.2d at 207, 247 N.E.2d at 260 (Fuld,
C.J., dissenting)).
14. In considering what constitutional protections must be afforded criminal de-
fendants in state court proceedings, the Supreme Court continues to use a
case by case method to analyze which rights of the first eight amendments
apply to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (guarantee
against double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to
jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)
(right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront
opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against
self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to the
assistance of counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(exclusionary rule made applicable to the states).
15. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The full implication of the Kent decision for the states is
not clear since the holding turned upon an interpretation of the D.C. Juvenile
Act, as well as the Federal Constitution. See generally Comment, In Re
Gault and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Juvenile Court, 51
MARQ. L. REV. 68, 72 (1967). For examples of state cases taking the position
that the holding in Kent was not based on constitutional grounds, see Powell
v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 684, 426 P.2d 756 (1969); Knott v. Langlois, 102 RJ. 517, 231
A.2d 767 (1967).
16. "We conclude, as we concluded regarding the essential due process safe-
guards applied in Gault, that the observance of the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt 'will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of
the substantive benefits of the juvenile process."' 397 U.S. at 367 (quoting
387 U.S. at 21).
19781
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
this balancing test in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,17 the Court re-
fused to extend the right of trial by jury to the adjudicatory phase
of a delinquency proceeding.18
In 1975, the Supreme Court again addressed the question of the
procedural due process rights of the juvenile offender. Breed v.
Jones19 presented the issue of whether jeopardy attached during
the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding in which a sev-
enteen year old was charged with having been involved in an
armed robbery and, as a result, faced potential incarceration in a
state facility. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Bur-
ger held that jeopardy attaches at the adjudicatory phase of a de-
linquency proceeding when a child is accused of committing an act
which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.20 As a
consequence of the Jones decision, prosecutors are barred from re-
trying a child so charged, either as a delinquent or as an adult,
once evidence has been offered at a delinquency adjudicatory
hearing.21
17. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
18. Justice Blackmun listed 13 separate grounds that were considered in
reaching the conclusion that trial by jury in a juvenile court was not an essen-
tial element of fundamental fairness. Id. at 545-51.
19. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). In Breed, a 17 year old was adjudicated a delin-
quent by the juvenile court under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1966)
for allegedly committing an armed robbery. During a subsequent disposition-
ary hearing held for the sole purpose of determining the proper treatment
and detention for Jones, the state moved that the juvenile court waive juris-
diction and that the defendant be tried as an adult criminal on the ground
that Jones would not be "amenable to the care, treatment and training pro-
gram available through the facilities of the juvenile court." CAL. WELF. & INsT.
CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1967). (Almost all states have similar procedures by
which a juvenile court may, under certain circumstances, waive its jurisdic-
tion over an alleged delinquent, and the child may then be tried as an adult
criminal.) Despite Jones' claim that jeopardy attached at the adjudicatory
hearing in which he was found to be a delinquent, the juvenile court waived
its jurisdiction, and Jones was subsequently tried and convicted of armed
robbery as an adult. After his conviction, Jones sought and was denied fed-
eral habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California. 343 F. Supp. 690, 692 (1972). The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed, 497 F.2d 1160, 1165 (1974), and the Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the procedure violated the principles of double jeopardy. 421
U.S. at 541.
20. "We therefore conclude that respondent was put in jeopardy at the adjudica-
tory hearing. Jeopardy attached when respondent was 'put to trial before
the trier of the facts,' . . . that is, when the Juvenile Court, as the trier of
facts, began to hear evidence." 421 U.S. at 531.
21. The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue of double
jeopardy in juvenile proceedings. In Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978),
the Court held that MD. CT. R. 911, which allows state officials to file excep-
tions to masters' findings in a juvenile proceeding and then obtain review of
those findings by a juvenile court judge, does not violate a juvenile's fifth
amendment right not to be twice placed in jeopardy.
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In all of these cases, a juvenile was charged with having com-
mitted an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult. In addition, the defendant in each case faced a possibility of
incarceration in a state facility. The Court has made it clear that
when these two factors are present, states must provide juvenile
defendants with the constitutional safeguards granted in In re
Gault, In re Winship, and Breed v. Jones.22
III. REVIEW OF STATE COURT CASES
A problem facing juvenile courts in applying the Gault,
Winship, and Jones decisions to a particular case arises from the
fact that all the defendants in those cases were charged with acts
which would have been criminal if committed by an adult and who,
if the acts were proved, faced potential incarceration in a state fa-
cility. As a result of these limitations, the juvenile courts confront
the question whether the common fact pattern in these decisions
establishes a condition precedent to the invocation of procedural
constitutional rights in a juvenile proceeding, or whether it merely
presents the clearest example of when the rights attach. This
problem is underscored by the fact that the Supreme Court, in ren-
dering the Gault decision, specifically limited its holding to the
facts presented.
We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate
to the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juve-
nile is a "delinquent" as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with
the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution.2 3
Similar limitations were made in Winship,24 in which the Court
specifically refused to pass on the "constitutionality of the New
York procedures governing children 'in need of supervision.' "2
The uncertainty surrounding these cases can be illustrated by
considering three fact patterns which are clearly distinguishable
from the Gault line of cases. In the first, a juvenile, although
charged with an act which does not constitute a crime if committed
by an adult, still faces incarceration in a state institution if the
charges are proved. In the second, the juvenile is charged with an
act which technically constitutes a crime if committed by an adult,
but the juvenile does not face potential incarceration. In the third,
the acts complained of do not technically constitute a crime if com-
22. State courts have so held. See Hatcher v. State, 260 Ark. 903, 545 S.W.2d 632
(1977); E.V.R. v. State, 342 So. 2d 93 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977); In re Henderson, 199
N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972); In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975).
23. 387 U.S. at 13.
24. See note 13 supra.
25. 397 U.S. at 359 n.l.
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mitted by an adult, and the juvenile does not face potential incar-
ceration in a state institution.
Several state courts, in applying the Gault line of cases, have
suggested that both the above criteria must be met.26 These
courts have created a two-pronged test to determine when a juve-
nile will be afforded the protections demanded by the Federal Con-
stitution: A juvenile must be charged with an act which would be
criminal if committed by an adult and if proved must face potential
incarceration in order for the constitutional protections to attach.
It must be noted, however, that in some of these cases the facts
presented already complied with the two-pronged test, making it
unnecessary to decide whether the constitutional rights would at-
tach if one of the prongs was missing.27
Several courts have dealt with the specific question whether
the Gault line of cases applies in cases in which a juvenile either is
not charged with an act which would be a crime if committed by an
adult or does not face potential incarceration. As might be ex-
pected, the limited authority has not answered this basic question
consistently.
The question has been most frequently presented when state
courts have endeavored to determine in exactly which circum-
stances Winship demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt in ju-
venile proceedings. In In re Henderson,28 the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that In re Winship did not necessitate adjudicating a
child delinquent by proof beyond a reasonable doubt when the
child's delinquency is predicated upon his being wayward or habit-
ually disobedient because he is uncontrolled by his parents. In
upholding the trial court's use of a clear and convincing evidence
standard at the adjudicatory hearing, the court expressed the view
that Winship only applies in cases in which the child is charged
with having committed a "public offense," and that the~due process
standard of fundamental fairness is not offended by using a lesser
evidentiary standard when the child is not so charged.29 In later
26. See Hatcher v. State, 260 Ark. 903, 545 S.W.2d 632 (1977); E.V.R. v. State, 342
So. 2d 93 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977); In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972); In
re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975).
27. In Hatcher v. State, 260 Ark. 903, 545 S.W.2d 632 (1977), Gault protections
were applied in a case in which a child charged with delinquency for alleg-
edly committing attempted battery faced incarceration in a training school.
In E.V.R. v. State, 342 So. 2d 93 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977), a delinquency proceeding
in which the juvenile was alleged to be a larcenist, the court held the right to
counsel conferred in Gault encompasses the presentation of a closing state-
ment. See also District of Columbia v. I.P., 335 A.2d 224 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).
28. 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972).
29. Id. at 121.
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cases, the Supreme Court of Iowa has reaTfimed its position.3°
In In re Walker,31 the Supreme Court of North Carolina con-
cluded that Winship does not control the burden of proof when ad-
judicating a child delinquent for having violated conditions of
probation. The court reasoned that under the facts of the case, a
violation of probation was not a "criminal" act; therefore, a lesser
standard of proof would be sufficient at the adjudicatory hearing.32
The Court of Appeals of Oregon in In re K. 33 determined that
Gault and Winship would not apply unless the juvenile offender
faced potential incarceration in a training school, even though the
child was charged with having committed an act which would have
been a crime if he had been an adult.3 4
On the other hand, several New York courts have refused to
distinguish among types of juvenile proceedings to determine the
application of constitutional rights. In a memorandum opinion,
the court in In re William D.3 - held that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is necessary to adjudicate a child a PINS.36 Similarly, in In
re Michael E., 3 7 the court refused to afford fewer procedural rights
to a child charged with being a PINS for allegedly cursing, and
throwing stones and cherry bombs, than to a child alleged to be
30. In re Wheeler, 229 N.W.2d 241 (Iowa 1975); In re Potter, 237 N.W.2d 461 (Iowa
1976).
31. 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972).
32. Id. at 41, 191 S.E.2d at 711. The juvenile in Walker had previously been adju-
dicated an undisciplined child and placed on probation. Subsequent to that
disposition, the juvenile was charged with being a delinquent for violating the
terms of her probation, pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278 (1969), which
defines a delinquent as "any child who has committed any criminal offense
under State law or under an ordinance of local government, including viola-
tions of the motor vehicle laws or a child who has violated the conditions of
his probation under this article."
It must also be noted that in another portion of the court's opinion, it held
that the juvenile was not entitled to appointed counsel when she was adjudi-
cated an undisciplined child. 282 N.C. at 37, 191 S.E.2d at 708. The reason for
this holding was that an undisciplined child does not face the possibility of
institutional commitment. Consequently, the Walker opinion indicates that
both elements of the two-pronged test must be present before procedural due
process rights attach.
33. 26 Or. App. 451, 554 P.2d 180 (1976).
34. Id. at 457, 554 P.2d at 183. The court held that a juvenile can be found to
"knowingly and willingly enter and remain in a dwelling with the intent to
commit a crime therein" on an evidentiary standard less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt because under another statute, Op- REv. STAT. § 420.011
(1975), a juvenile of his age could not be committed to a training school 26
Or. App. at 451, 554 P.2d at 182-83.
35. 36 A.D.2d 970, 321 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1971).
36. Id.




State courts faced with the issue of self-incrimination have also
analyzed the question of when the Gault line of cases must be ap-
plied. In Leach v. Texas,3 9 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals deter-
mined that a child charged with being a danger to herself is
entitled to the fifth amendment protection against sef-incrimina-
tion.4o In reaching its decision, the court applied Gault without
any reference to whether the child's acts would have been criminal
if committed by an adult.41
The question of when the protection against self-incrimination
must be afforded to a juvenile was also explored by Maryland's
highest court in In re Spalding. 2  This case is important for a
number of reasons. First, both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Spalding more thoroughly evaluated the problem than did
most of the other state courts in the cases discussed. Second, the
court considered whether or not the Gault line of cases should be
applied equally in both CINS and delinquency proceedings.
38. Id. at 490, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 87. Under New York law, disorderly conduct is de-
fined thus:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a
risk thereof:
1. He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening
behavior; or
2. He makes unreasonable noise; or
3. In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or
makes an obscene gesture; or
4. Without lawful authority, he disturbs any lawful assembly or
meeting of persons; or
5. He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic; or
6. He congregates with other persons in a public place and re-
fuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse; or
7. He creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by
any act which serves no legitimate purpose.
Disorderly conduct is a violation.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20 (McKinney 1975). Therefore, if the requisite intent
could be proved, it is possible that this activity would constitute a violation
under New York law. See also In re Renauldo R., 73 Misc. 2d 390, 341
N.Y.S.2d 998 (Fano. Ct. 1973).
39. 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
40. Id. at 821.
41. Leach involved a 12 year old girl adjudicated delinquent because she
habitually deports herself as to injure or endanger the morals or
health of herself and other(s)... to wit: Runaway on the 25th day of
March, 1967, Runaway on the 30th day of June, 1967, Runaway on the
11th day of July, 1967, Runaway on the 26th day of July, 1967.
Id. at 819.
The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded because statements
taken from the juvenile in violation of her fifth amendment rights were admit-
ted into evidence. Id. at 821.
42. 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975).
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Third, the majority's treatment of the problem clearly demon-
strates how over-reliance on the special- solicitude supposedly af-
forded juveniles by juvenile courts can result in a niggardly
apportionment of basic constitutional rights, if not an out and out
denial of those rights.
In Spalding the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed a prior
determination that a thirteen year old was in need of supervi-
sion because she "'deported [her]self as to injure or endanger
[her] self and others' and therefore required 'guidance, treatment,
or rehabilitation.' 43 After an in-depth analysis of the Supreme
Court cases, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that the
issues raised by the facts of the Spalding case fell outside the pur-
view of the Kent, Winship and Gault holdings.44
The initial juvenile proceeding was commenced on February
1, 1973, with the filing of a petition charging Cindy Ann Spalding
with being a CINS and a delinquent.45 On that same day in juve-
nile court, she was adjudicated a CINS, and the delinquency
charge was apparently dismissed.
The factual allegations of the petition were, in large part, based
on a confession elicited from Cindy Ann by the police during ques-
tioning on the previous day. Cindy Ann and her mother had both
been requested to come to the police station to answer questions
about certain activities of Cindy's.4 6 This interrogation produced
oral and written admissions by Cindy Ann that she had attended a
number of parties at which she had consumed narcotics and en-
gaged in sexual activities with adult men and women. She also
admitted that in order to attend these parties she had placed sleep-
43. Id. at 698, 332 A.2d at 250.
44. Since Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), was decided subsequent to the
Spalding case, its reasoning was not considered by the Maryland Court of
Appeals. See notes 19-20 & accompanying text supra.
45. 273 Md. at 693-94, 332 A.2d at 248.
46. Initially, this case involved two children, Victoria Elaine Carter, age 11,
and' Cindy Ann Spalding, age 13. The actual investigation began when
the police were called to a hospital to investigate the possibility that Elaine
Carter had been raped in addition to having taken an overdose of drugs. At
the hospital the investigating officer was informed by the girl's parents that
their daughter had taken a white tablet, and that she had also admitted to
having had sexual intercourse with an adult male on the previous evening.
After a series of medical examinations, the child and her parents went to the
Dundalk Police Station for further questioning. At approximately the same
time Cindy Ann and her mother arrived at the police station in response to a
telephone call from the investigating officer. Elaine Carter, like Cindy Ann,
was charged with being a child in need of supervision and a delinquent. In
re Carter & Spalding, 20 Md. App. 633, 318 A.2d 269 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
Elaine Carter did not join in the petition for certiorari to the Maryland Court
of Appeals since she had already been returned to the custody of her parents.
273 Md. at 698, 332 A.2d at 250 n.6.
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ing pills in her mother's coffee.47
At the trial de novo the defense counsel moved for the suppres-
sion of Cindy Ann's statements on the ground that they were taken
in violation of her fifth amendment rights, since the police had
failed to warn her properly of her rights in accordance with the
requirements of Miranda v. Arizona.48 A further fifth amendment
issue was raised when the defense objected to the state calling
Cindy Ann to testify at the trial. The trial judge, however, admit-
ted the statements into evidence and compelled Cindy Ann to tes-
tify. At the conclusion of the trial de novo, Cindy Ann was
adjudicated a CINS and the judge ordered that she be placed in a
foster home.49
The case was then reviewed by the court of special appeals,
which affirmed the decisions of the trial judge. The court initially
rejected the contention that Miranda required that the confes-
sions be suppressed, concluding that "appellants were not in cus-
tody at the time of the statements in question."50 Of greater
significance, the court then went on to make the broad holding that
a juvenile's fifth amendment rights as defined by Gault are not ap-
plicable to a CINS proceeding.5 ' This conclusion was based on the
court's belief that the philosophy and implementation of the CINS
proceeding sufficiently distinguished it from a delinquency pro-
ceeding.52
Although affirming the decision of the court of special appeals,
the Maryland Court of Appeals chose to base its decision on the
narrow facts presented by the case. The majority reasoned that
the United States Supreme Court in Gault and Winship estab-
lished a two-pronged test to determine when the procedural rights
granted by these decisions apply in juvenile cases. According to
the majority opinion, this test requires (1) that a child be charged
with having committed an act that would constitute a crime if com-
mitted by an adult and (2) that the possibility exists that the child
will be confined in a state institution before due process demands
application of the protection against self-incrimination. 53
The court then applied this test to the facts of the case, conclud-
ing that Cindy Ann's acts would not have constituted criminal acts
if committed by an adult. As a consequence of this determination,
the judges were able to hold that the child was not deprived of her
47. 273 Md. at 693, 332 A.2d at 248.
48. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49. 273 Md. at 698, 332 A.2d at 250.
50. 20 Md. App. at 642, 318 A.2d at 275.
51. Id. at 654, 318 A.2d at 281.
52. Id. at 645-54, 318 A.2d at 276-82.
53. 273 Md. at 704-05, 332 A.2d at 254.
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right against self-incrimination since the facts of the case failed to
meet the criteria of the first prong of the test.54 By treating the
case in this manner, the court found it completely unnecessary to
consider the second prong of the test in rendering its decision.
The court of appeals took care to point out that its holding did
not automatically apply to all children allegedly in need of supervi-
sion. Instead it recognized that the United States Supreme Court
in Gault and Winship refused to accept a state's labeling of a juve-
nile proceeding as either criminal or civil as being determinative of
whether or not due process requires the invocation of certain con-
stitutional rights.55 The opinion of the court clearly states that the
first prong of the test will be complied with if a child is alleged to
have committed an act that would have constituted a crime if com-
mitted by an adult, regardless of whether the child is charged as
being a delinquent or a CINS.56 The court reached the conclusion
that Cindy Ann's acts were not criminal in nature by categorizing
her as a victim of, rather than as a participant in, criminal activ-
ity.57
This characterization of Cindy Ann as a victim was predicated
both upon certain statements and actions of the police, and the dis-
position of her case in the lower courts. The court of appeals
made specific reference to the fact that an investigating police of-
ficer testified that he viewed Cindy as a victim. Additionally, the
fact that the police immediately sought warrants for the arrest of
the adults who allegedly participated in the sex acts with Cindy
Ann, charging them with "statutory rape" and "unnatural and per-
verted sexual practices," was cited as further evidence that the po-
lice viewed the Spalding child as a victim of a crime. 5 The court
of appeals simply went on to dismiss as an anomaly the fact that
Cindy Ann was initially charged as a delinquent.59 To further but-
tress its conclusion that Cindy Ann Spalding was not a perpetrator
54. Id. at 709, 332 A.2d at 257.
55. Id. at 703-06, 332 A.2d at 253-54.
56. Wrhatever else is established by Gault, it is clear that labels are not
controlling. . . . In regard to the first "prong" of the test, for exam-
ple, it is doubtful that the Gault result would have been different had
merely the title of the proceedings been changed from "delinquency"
to "CINS" .... The essential element is that the juvenile be
charged with an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult.
Id. at 703, 332 A.2d at 253.
57. Id. at 708, 332 A.2d at 256.
58. 'The testimony describing the circumstances at the hospital and the police
station clearly depicts the girls as victims of 'sex' crimes committed by the
adults." Id.
59. "But, in the context of all the material events, which ensued during the criti-
cal period, since she was, in fact, a victim, the charge of 'delinquency' in the
petition must be regarded as simply an unexplained anomaly." Id
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of criminal acts, the court cited the fact that the master presiding
at the adjudicatory hearing, in his memorandum adjudicating her a
CINS, described Cindy Ann as having been victimized by a group
of adults. 60
Judge Eldridge disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
Cindy Ann did not commit acts which would be criminal if commit-
ted by an adult.6 1 Although agreeing with the majority that the
Supreme Court cases establish a two-pronged test for determining
when fifth amendment rights apply to juvenile cases, 62 he was un-
able to concur with the majority's application of that test to the
facts in Spalding.
Rather, he charged that when the majority characterized Cindy
Ann as a victim of crime, thereby negating the application of her
fifth amendment rights, it failed to heed its own admonition that
labels are not controlling.63 Judge Eldridge based his contention
on the premise that the facts which established the basis for Cindy
Ann's adjudication as a CINS constituted acts which would have
been crimes if committed by an adult.64 The judge, quoting from
the initial petition and the opinions of the masters and the trial
judge, demonstrated that from the filing of the petition through the
de novo hearing, the underlying invocation of the juvenile court
system was predicated upon Cindy Ann's alleged commission of
unnatural and perverted sex acts and her consumption of con-
trolled and prohibited drugs.65 He then concluded that when ap-
60. Id. The memorandum to which the court referred stated, in part:
Police investigation indicates that these young girls had been
victimized by a group of adults in the Dundalk area and elsewhere,
for purposes of sexual abuse and drug experimentation. It is not
known at this point just how much damage has already been done,
physically and psychologically, to these girls.
Id. at 694, 332 A.2d at 248-49.
61. Id. at 710, 332 A.2d at 257 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
62. 'The majority opinion, in my view, correctly construes Gault and the subse-
quent Supreme Court cases, as setting forth a two-pronged test for determin-
ing whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
applicable to a juvenile proceeding." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 710-14, 332 A.2d at 257-59.
65. In the petition to the juvenile court, fied February 1, 1973, Cindy Ann
Spalding was charged with being a delinquent child and a child in
need of supervision. The only specific facts alleged in the petition as
a basis for the charges were that "respondent has consumed con-
trolled and prohibited narcotics and engaged in acts of sexual inter-
course and sexual perversion with an unknown number of male and
female adults for a period of more than one year."...
The juvenile court master, Mr. Kahl, on February 1, 1973, signed a
"Commitment Order," which recited that Cindy Ann Spalding has
been adjudged a child in need of supervision, and which committed
her to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services. ...
Other than a reference to the fact that the girls needed medical treat-
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plying the rights afforded juveniles by Gault and the subsequent
Supreme Court decisions in a CINS proceeding, it is necessary to
examine the underlying factual allegations to determine if a child
has committed acts which would be criminal if committed by an
adult.66 Applying this standard to the facts of Spalding, Judge El-
dridge determined that Cindy Ann's alleged acts would have been
violations of the Maryland Criminal Code if she had not been a
minor.67 After thus deciding that the first prong of the test had
been met, the dissent then examined the applicable Maryland law
and similarly concluded that the second prong of the test, i.e., the
loss of liberty, had also been satisfied.6 8 Since both requirements
of the majority's test had been fulfilled, Judge Eldridge concluded
that Cindy Ann Spalding was denied her fifth amendment rights
when her confession was admitted into evidence and she was com-
pelled to testify against herself at the trial.6 9
A survey of reported state court decisions which attempt to de-
cide when the Gault line of cases must be applied in juvenile adju-
dicatory proceedings produces three conclusions: (1) the authority
is suprisingly scant, (2) the available authority is inconsistent, and
(3) the majority of state courts have concluded that invocation of
procedural due process rights in a juvenile adjudicatory proceed-
ing is mandated only when the juvenile is charged with an act
which would be a crime if committed by an adult and, if the charge
is proved, faces potential incarceration. These courts have thus
adopted a strict two-pronged test for the invocation of these rights.
The remainder of this article will be devoted to analyzing the state
court cases and developing an alternative to the two-pronged test
as applied in the majority of state courts.
ment, the sexual conduct and drug abuse constituted the only facts
or basis set forth in the memorandum for the commitment order....
The trial judge, in his opinion he delivered at the end of the trial ad-
judicating petitioner and her co-defendant to be "children in need of
supervision," found as a fact that the girls "have been associated in
immoral sexual activities" and have "indulged" in the taking of
"drugs of a narcotic nature."
Id. at 711-12, 332 A.2d at 258.
66. [A] s this case illustrates, criminal conduct may furnish the factual
basis for the "CINS" adjudication. For example, "CINS" includes
children who are "habitually disobedient, ungovernable, and beyond
[their parents'] control.". . . The evidence of such characteristics, as
in this case, may be criminal acts. "CINS" also includes a child who
"[d] eports himself so as to injure or endanger himself or others."...
Of course, a child who commits criminal acts such as using narcotic
drugs or "drugging" someone else, is deporting herself "so as to in-
jure or endanger" herself or others.
Id. at 713, 332 A.2d at 259.
67. Id. at 712, 332 A.2d at 258.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 713-14, 332 A.2d at 259.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE COURT DECISIONS
An analysis of the limited extension of due process rights by
state courts applying the Gault line of cases must be made on two
levels. First, if it is assumed that the courts employing a strict
two-pronged test are correct, it must be determined how this test
should be applied. The importance of this inquiry is brought to
the forefront by the intriguing reasoning the Maryland Court of
Appeals used to conclude that the juvenile in Spalding did not
commit an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult. Second, an additional consideration must be made: Is the
minority view that the two-pronged test is overly restrictive correct
and if so, what test should be substituted?
A. Analysis of the Determination That a Juvenile's Acts Would Constitute
a "Crime if Committed by an Adult"
It would appear that Judge Eldridge took the correct approach
in applying the two-pronged test to the facts of Spalding. As he
pointed out,70 the alleged acts would have constituted crimes if
committed by an adult. The Maryland Criminal Code provides
that any man or woman who performs any unnatural sex act is
subject to a fine not to exceed $1,000 or imprisonment not to exceed
ten years.7 ' Similarly, a person who uses or possesses any con-
trolled dangerous substance is subject to a potential imprisonment
of four years.72 In light of Maryland law, it is almost impossible to
comprehend how the majority reached its conclusion that a child,
who allegedly engaged in unnatural sex acts with adult women and
consumed narcotic drugs, did not commit acts of a criminal nature.
It is difficult to argue with the conclusion of the masters and
judges that the facts in Spalding present a rather clear picture of a
thirteen year old child being abused and victimized by a group of
adults. However, the real issue is whether a child's status as a
victim of adult criminal activity is a sufficient legal standard upon
which to deprive him or her of constitutional safeguards.
The first problem in utilizing such a standard is determining the
outer limits of the test. Judge Eldridge suggests that the major-
ity's logic would allow the characterization of a juvenile as a victim
whenever he or she was being controlled by adults. He suggests
that a child engaging in an armed robbery in collusion with adults
can be viewed as a victim and, if charged as a CINS, can be so
adjudicated without ever having the benefit of the right against
70. Id. at 712, 332 A.2d at 258.
71. MD. CRm. LAw CODE ANN. § 554 (Supp. 1977).
72. Id, § 287(d)-(e) (1976).
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self-incrimination. 73 It is doubtful the majority would extend the
holding of Spalding to this situation, but Judge Eldridge's hypoth-
esis demonstrates the fragile nature of the Spalding test.
On the other hand, it could be argued that a child's status as a
victim under Spalding must be limited to situations in which the
child is being used by an adult in the perpetration of a so-called
victimless crime. The apparent merit of this approach dissipates,
however, when it is applied to the fact that Cindy Ann was charged
with consuming prohibited drugs. The Maryland Criminal Code
states that the purpose of the drug laws is "to prevent [drug]
abuse which results in a serious health problem to the individual
and represents a serious danger to the welfare of the people. 7 4
Thus, it would be difficult to conclude that the Maryland Legisla-
ture intended to categorize the consumption of prohibited drugs as
a victimless crime. If the application of the protection against self-
incrimination to a child charged with being in need of supervision
depends, in part, on whether the facts of the case render the child
a victim, future litigation is necessary to define effectively the term
"victim."
Further, the majority's victim participant dichotomy does not
give a clear guideline to law enforcement agencies and might even
encourage official misconduct. Officers investigating alleged juve-
nile offenses in Maryland, when determining whether or not they
should give Miranda warnings to a suspect, may now also take into
consideration whether a child might be categorized a victim.
Therefore, in a given case, officers burdened with the many
problems of effectuating an adequate waiver from a juvenile75 may
convince themselves that the child is a victim according to
Spalding and dispense with the Miranda warnings. An officer's
73. The majority opinion in this case could have significant conse-
quences. Because Cindy Ann Spalding is labelled a "victim," and
because the proceedings are called "CINS" instead of "delinquent,"
she is deemed not entitled to those constitutional rights which the
Supreme Court has held are applicable in juvenile proceedings.
However, if petitioner was a "victim," anytime a juvenile is engaged
in criminal activity with adults, the juvenile could be said to be a
"victim." A teenager might be enticed by an adult into engaging in a
series of armed robberies with the adult, and could be viewed as a
'victim."
273 Md. at 716, 332 A.2d at 260.
74. MD. Can. LAw COpE ANN. § 276(a) (1976).
75. For a discussion of the problems of obtaining a valid waiver of fifth amend-
ment rights by a juve'nile, see Comment, Constitutional Law-Miranda
Warnings to Juveniles in New Jersey: The Worst of Both Worlds Revisited, 26
RUTGERS L REV. 358 (1973); Note, The Admissibility of Juvenile Confessions:
Is an Intelligent and Knowing Waiver of Constitutional Rights Possible With-
out Adult Guidance?, 34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 321 (1972).
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misapplication of this rather unclear standard may result in the
suppression of vital evidence.
Potential abuse in the application of the Spalding decision is
presented by the facts of the case. It must be remembered that
Cindy Ann was originally charged with being both a delinquent
and a CINS. 76 As was previously demonstrated, she allegedly
committed acts which would be criminal if committed by adults.77
Consequently, it would appear that the original delinquency
charge was correctly initiated. However, these same factual alle-
gations also provided the basis for her being declared ungovern-
able or a danger to herself, thus rendering her a CINS.78
Therefore, in a case in which the investigating officers fail to pro-
vide a juvenile with fifth amendment protections, the prosecuting
attorney would have the option of correcting the officer's miscon-
duct by arguing at the adjudicatory hearing that the child was a
victim and under Spalding may be adjudicated a CINS, without
regard to the constitutional protection against self-incrimination.
Despite the inevitable problems created by its Spalding opin-
ion, the court quite properly refused to follow the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals in allowing legislative labels to determine when
constitutional rights apply in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings.
This important decision was made when the court determined that
it was necessary to inquire whether the underlying act charged
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult rather than sim-
ply to conclude that the Gault line of cases do not apply in CINS
proceedings.7 9 Consequently, the Maryland Court of Appeals re-
76. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 65 & 71-72 supra.
78. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
79. See text accompanying note 56 supra. Compare In re Wheeler, 229 N.W.2d
241 (Iowa 1975), in which the Supreme Court of Iowa acknowledged that an
important question is whether courts should rely on the formal charge or look
to the underlying facts when determining which constitutional safeguards
must be applied in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings. However, the court
determined that resolution of this fundamental question was unnecessary to
a decision in that case.
In Wheeler, a 15 year old was charged with delinquency for (1) break-
ing and entering with intent to commit a public offense and 12) habitually
deporting himself in a manner injurious to himself or others by breaking and
entering and committing lascivious acts with a minor. Id. at 241. The appli-
cable Iowa code provided, inter alia, that " '[t]he court's finding ... [of] de-
linquency shall be based upon clear and convincing evidence under the rules
applicable to the trial of civil cases .... "' Id.
It was argued on behalf of the juvenile that "when a finding of delinquency
is grounded upon commission of an act which would constitute a crime if
committed by an adult it is constitutionally impermissible to apply the 'clear
and convincing' standard of proof rather than the requirement of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt." Id. The court concluded that the evidence proved
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quired consideration of the underlying basis for the charge regard-
less of whether the juvenile was officially charged with being
delinquent or a CINS. This means that even if a juvenile is offi-
cially charged with what is generically referred to as a status of-
fense, the inquiry still must be made as to whether the actual acts
which must be proved to adjudicate the juvenile guilty would con-
stitute a crime if committed by an adult. It must be remembered
that the Maryland Court of Appeals believed that the Gault and
Winship decisions mandated this approach.80
In Gault, the Supreme Court was presented with the argument
that the protection against self-incrimination does not apply in ju-
venile cases because of the civil nature of a juvenile proceeding.
This argument was premised on the fact that the fifth amendment
statement of that protection refers only to criminal proceedings. 81
This position was clearly rejected by the Court when it stated:
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all
statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to "criminal"
involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine "delin-
quency," which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be
regarded as "criminal" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the
feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience which has been at-
tached to juvenile proceedings. 82
Three years later in Winship the Supreme Court again rejected the
argument that constitutional safeguards can be withheld in a juve-
nile proceeding on the basis that such a proceeding is not criminal
in nature and is not intended to punish the offender.83
beyond a reasonable doubt that breaking and entering had been committed.
More importantly, it was also contended that the juvenile court had applied
an unconstitutional standard of proof with respect to the "habitual deport-
ment" charge. It was argued that "the allegation of lascivious acts charged a
crime (required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt) despite being sub-
sumed under the 'habitual deportment' allegation." Id. at 243. Unfortu-
nately, the court never resolved these issues finding that the only ground for
delinquency was breaking and entering.
80. 273 Md. at 703, 332 A.2d at 253. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
81. "No person .. . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
82. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50.
83. In the course of its opinion in Winship, the Court stated:
In effect the Court of Appeals distinguished the proceedings in ques-
tion here from a criminal prosecution by use of what Gault called the
"'civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile pro-
ceedings.". . . But Gault expressly rejected that distinction as a rea-
son for holding the Due Process Clause inapplicable to a juvenile
proceeding .... The Court of Appeals also attempted to justify the
preponderance standard on the related ground that juvenile proceed-
ings are designed "not to punish, but to save the child."... Again,
however, Gault expressly rejected this justification.... We made
clear in that decision that civil labels and good intentions do not
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In Breed v. Jones84 the Supreme Court, citing Gault and
Winship, again clearly stated that the invocation of constitutional
rights in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings must not be dependent
upon shorthand labels. The Court stated: "For it is clear under
our cases that determining the relevance of constitutional policies,
like determining the applicability of constitutional rights, in juve-
nile proceedings, requires that courts eschew 'the "civil" label-of-
convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings.' ",85
In light of the admonition in Gault, Winship and Jones that mere
labels do not determine whether a juvenile must be afforded proce-
dural due process protections during juvenile adjudicatory pro-
ceedings, it would appear that the recent trend to re-classify
juvenile offenses should not affect the application of those rights.
Therefore, if the application of those rights is predicated upon the
juvenile's being charged with committing an act which would con-
stitute a crime if committed by an adult, the court must look to the
underlying factual basis of the charge.
B. An Alternative to the Two-Pronged Test
State courts recognize that the procedural safeguards defined
by Gault, Winship, and Jones attach during the adjudicatory pro-
ceedings when a juvenile is charged with an act which would con-
stitute a crime if committed by an adult, and if proved, face
potential incarceration. Until the Supreme Court reviews a case
arising under facts which clearly present the issue of whether the
Gault line of cases applies when either or both of the elements of
the two-pronged test is not present, one can only speculate as to
whether the constitutional protections defined by the Court would
extend to such a child. The scant authority found in state courts
falls far short of being any indication of how the Supreme Court
will decide the issue. The development of an alternative test man-
dates consideration of the purpose of creating a separate juvenile
court system.
For more than three-quarters of a century, American jurispru-
dence has been struggling to establish a specialized procedure to
themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in
juvenile courts, for "[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the
child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecu-
tion."
397 U.S. at 356-66 (citing and quoting 387 U.S. at 27, 50-51; 24 N.Y.2d at 197, 247
N.E.2d at 254).
84. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
85. Id. at 529 (quoting 387 U.S. at 50).
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deal with the unique problems of juveniles.86 It is not disputed
that this endeavor has afforded certain benefits to juvenile offend-
ers. If the juvenile system is examined as a whole, however, it
must also be recognized that children are put in a rather special
category.8 7 The consequence of the creation of this special cate-
gory is that the juvenile laws place duties upon children which do
not extend to adults, the breach of which may bring them before
the judicial system. For example, under most state laws, a child
may be adjudged delinquent or in need of supervision for status
offenses like truancy, and as a result, may be separated from home,
placed in a foster or group home, or even institutionalized.88 Thus,
if satisfaction of the two-pronged test is necessary before a juve-
nile is afforded procedural due process rights in a juvenile adjudi-
catory proceeding, a juvenile charged with truancy would not be
afforded these protections even if he or she faces incarceration in a
state institution. This denial of rights would result from the fact
that truancy, by definition, cannot be an adult crime. Conse-
quently, the first prong of the test would not be met. This result
could be altered under the application of the two-pronged test only
if a court inquired into the underlying cause of the truancy and
found that the juvenile's absence from school was the result of the
commission of acts which would constitute a crirme if committed
by an adult. The application of the two-pronged test in a truancy
case results from a failure to recognize that children, by virtue of
their age, have a duty placed upon them by state law, the breach of
which could result in a loss of liberty.
Therefore, it must be recognized that when juveniles charged
with truancy are brought before juvenile courts, those juveniles,
because of the special duty the law places on them, are in the same
position as adults charged with the commission of penal offenses.
In view of this similarity between the juvenile and criminal court
systems,89 it defies logic to deny the juvenile due process protec-
tions which would be afforded an adult defendant simply because
an adult cannot be charged with committing an offense which was
specially designed to govern juveniles.
86. The first juvenile court system in the United States was established in Illinois
in 1899 by the Law of April 21, 1899 Ill Laws 131.
87. For a discussion of the unique legal position in which the juvenile court sys-
tem places adolescents, see Forer, Rights of Children The Legal Vacuum, 55
A.B.A.J. 1151 (1969).
88. It has been estimated that over two-thirds of the states have specifically enu-
merated truancy as a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction over children. Ro-
senberg & Rosenberg, Truancy, School Phobia and Minimal Brain
Dysfunction, 61 MN. L REV. 543,544 n.5 (1977). See also notes 1-4 & accom-
panying text supra.
89. This characterization is limited to proceedings to determine whether a juve-
nile is a PINS, CINS, or a delinquent.
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Most reported state court decisions which have refused to ex-
tend the Gault line of cases beyond their facts have done so on the
basis that the first prong of the test, an act which if committed by
an adult would be a crime, was not present. However, at least one
appellate court decision refused to afford these due process protec-
tions to a juvenile charged with commission of criminal acts solely
because that juvenile did not face incarceration. 90 Thus, authority
exists that if either element of the two-pronged test is not present
in a juvenile adjudicatory proceeding, procedural due process
rights will not attach.9 1 Unfortunately, the incarceration element
has been used as a talisman to answer the question of what rights
should be afforded a juvenile rather than as a vehicle for analysis.
Although the first element of the two-pronged test is an inadequate
criterion upon which to determine the application of procedural
due process rights in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings, the incar-
ceration element of the test is an appropriate and viable point of
focus.
It is clear that the juveniles in Gault, Winship, and Jones faced
potential incarceration in a state institution. It would be possible,
therefore, to state that these Supreme Court cases set forth the
proposition that the protections defined therein are to be imple-
mented only when the juvenile is faced with the possibility of insti-
tutional confinement. Despite the fact that Justice Fortas'
majority opinion refers to the prison-like atmosphere which per-
vades juvenile detention and training centers,92 it would be an
over-simplification to state that the opinion foreclosed the possibil-
ity of applying these rights in a juvenile adjudicatory proceeding
which might result in a deprivation of liberty less restrictive than
commitment to a training center. In his review of the juvenile
court system, Justice Fortas acknowledged that a basic premise of
the system is that a juvenile has a right to custody but not to lib-
erty. Therefore, in appropriate circumstances, under the doctrine
ofparenspatriae, the state has the right to intervene and take cus-
tody of the juvenile. This theory allows the designation of a juve-
90. In re K., 26 Or. App. 451, 554 P.2d 180 (1976). See text accompanying notes 33-
34 supra.
91. See also note 32 supra.
92. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "re-
ceiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution
of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or
lesser time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls,
regimented routine and institutional hours .... " Instead of mother
and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his
world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delin-
quents" confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape
and homicide.
387 U.S. at 27.
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nile proceeding to be civil rather than criminal and nullifies the
need to extend the procedural safeguards of the criminal justice
system to the juvenile courts. 93 The Court then observed that de-
spite high ideals and motivations, a juvenile procedure was estab-
lished "unknown to our law in any comparable context. The
constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is-to
say the least-debatable."94
In view of the doubt cast upon the theoretical basis for the crea-
tion of the juvenile court system and the frequent references to
loss of liberty in the Gault opinion,95 it would be appropriate for
courts applying that decision to approach the question of whether
constitutional rights attach in terms of the potential loss of liberty
facing the juvenile. Specifically, the question must be answered
whether potential placement in a foster or group home would con-
stitute a substantial enough threat to liberty so as to necessitate
the invocation of procedural due process protections. Unfortu-
nately, state courts have not addressed this issue. If the courts do
decide to analyze this issue they should realize that placement in a
foster or group home is one of the characteristics unique to the
juvenile court system. It would be unfortunate if courts reason
that because these alternative forms of commitment are less ab-
horrent than placement in a training center, it automatically fol-
lows that use of these alternatives does not constitute a
deprivation of liberty. It would be appropriate to inquire into
whether the removal of a juvenile from the family situation consti-
tutes a deprivation of the right of liberty. If this question is an-
swered in the affirmative, the groundwork is laid for an appropriate
test to determine whether procedural due process rights must be
applied in a juvenile adjudicatory proceeding. Simply stated, if a
juvenile faces a potential loss of liberty for allegedly breaching a
duty imposed on the juvenile by law as a result of his or her status
as a juvenile, or for commission of acts which would constitute a
crime if committed by an adult, procedural due process safeguards
must be afforded the juvenile during the adjudicatory proceeding.
The practical effect of utilizing this test would be that in most
cases, juveniles who are charged as delinquents, PINS, or CINS
and face a deprivation of liberty by virtue of potential placement in
a foster or group home or training center will be entitled to all the
protections flowing from the Gault line of cases. Admittedly, this
goes beyond the Supreme Court decisions.
It is impossible to predict if the Supreme Court will extend the
Gault, Winship and Jones due process safeguards to cases in
93. Id. at 16-17.
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id. at 13, 27, 29, 31 n.48, 34, 36-37, 41, 50, 56 & 57.
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which the juvenile is charged with a status offense and faces po-
tential placement in a foster home. However, it must be noted
that in Jones, the most recent of the Gault line of cases, a unani-
mous Court expressed the view that the juvenile court system, as
actually applied, has not been able to attain its initial goals. 9 6 Per-
haps this acknowledgement by the Supreme Court may indicate
the eventual expansion of constitutional rights in juvenile proceed-
ings.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault there have
been surprisingly few recorded state court decisions addressing
the fundamental question as to when the Gault line of protections
must be afforded a juvenile. A majority of these cases have de-
cided that a juvenile is not entitled to the Gault protections unless
he or she is charged with having committed an act which would not
only constitute a crime if committed by an adult but would also
result in possible incarceration.
This two-pronged test, which is not mandated by the Supreme
Court of the United States, fails for two reasons. First, it does not
take into consideration the special behavioral standards imposed
upon juveniles by state law solely because of their age and second,
it focuses only on the more extreme forms of deprivation of liberty
such as state institutions rather than foster care.
The two-pronged test should be abandoned in favor of a princi-
ple that whenever a juvenile faces a potential loss of liberty for
having allegedly breached a duty imposed on the juvenile by law
as a result of his or her status as a juvenile, or for commission of
acts which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the
Gault protections must be afforded the juvenile.
96. Although the juvenile-court system had its genesis in the desire to
provide a distinctive procedure and setting to deal with the problems
of youth, including those manifested by antisocial conduct, our deci-
sions in recent years have recognized that there is a gap between the
originally benign conception of the system and its realities. With the
exception of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,... the Court's response to
that perception has been to make applicable in juvenile proceedings
constitutional guarantees associated with traditional criminal prose-
cutions.... In so doing the Court has evinced awareness of the
threat which such a process represents to the efforts of the juvenile-
court system, functioning in a unique manner, to ameliorate the
harshness of criminal justice when applied to youthful offenders.
That the system has fallen short of the high expectations of its spon-
sors in no way detracts from the broad social benefits sought or from
those benefits that can survive constitutional scrutiny.
421 U.S. at 529.
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